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Abstract: The article begins with an inquiry on St. Thomas Aquinas' theological 
framework of God in the Summa Theologica, as seen through the lenses of Pseudo-
Dionysius and Proclus Lycaeus, in the Light of Plato's dialectical exploration of the 
One in the Parmenides. We proceed to the similarities and differences between St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ theology and Plato’s philosophy in terms of the means through which 
the soul ascends towards the highest vision. Ideas of thinkers such as Democritus, 
Aristotle, Iamblichus, Thomas Taylor, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger 
supported or provided counter arguments regarding these matters. The essay raises a 
significant question pertaining to the relationship between Plato’s thought with that of 
St. Thomas Aquinas’. 
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In the Metaphysics, Aristotle attempts to utilize a physical theology as a form of 
ascent to contemplative philosophy. He also states that this study is to be chosen over 
all other sciences; and it is this “first science of theology''1 that we must prefer to all 
other kinds of contemplation, the study of the divine. Through the 2nd century C.E. 
and onward, the development of Christian theology was partly inspired by 
interpretations of Neoplatonism, a term coined by early 19th century European 
scholarship to signify a period of time after Plato that began with the successors of 
Plato’s Academy, including Aristotle and later Plotinus and Proclus. This essay will 
focus on the Christian view of God through the lenses of the Prima Pars, of the Summa 
Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, contrasted with Plato’s view of the One in 
Parmenides, with its further elucidation by the Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, 
written during the 5th century C.E. by Proclus.2  
For the Platonic tradition, the One is not only superior to Soul and Intellect, but It 
is even beyond Being itself, truly ineffable; the same way the Christian God is above 
all assertions and negations, and that through which all divine beings and faculties 
exist.3 From the entirety of the Platonic corpus, the Timaeus and the Parmenides have 
been considered the substance of Plato’s thought, the former being on a mystical 
cosmology and the latter on metaphysical theology.4 The Parmenides contains nine 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis treats the dialectical exploration of how there is no 
name, discourse, science, opinion, or knowledge of the One, while the second 
hypothesis takes the predicates intelligibly negated in the first, and asserts them of the 
One coordinate with Being.5 The distinction between I. what can be said of the 
One/God beyond Being and II. what can be said of the One/God coordinate with 
Being plays a major role in understanding systematic theology and will be explored in 
the second part of the argument. Since the hypotheses treat an extended range of 
metaphysical attributes, this paper will only go through the dialectics of two terms, 
whose development is expounded in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. 
Subsequently, these will be further contrasted with Thomas Aquinas’ theological 
framework of God in the Summa Theologica.   
In Roman Catholicism, it is the sum of all known learning and doctrine, of all that 
can be known about God and the relationship between God and humanity.6 Aristotle’s 
works had a profound impact on St. Thomas’ thought. This is evident in the five ways 
to prove God’s existence from the effects caused in the visible world and other passages 
of this nature.7 In the Summa Theologica, he studies and creates a structure for the 
Sacred Doctrine, which is a science that “proceeds from principles established by the 
light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed”.8 Alongside with 
the Aristotelian influence, Pseudo-Dionysius is a figure whose writings are quoted over 
1700 times in the Summa Theologica and constitute a substantial part on which St. 
Thomas’ system relies.9 Pseudo-Dionysius’ works emerged in Europe at the end of the 
5th century C.E. and have had a significant impact on Western thought. His identity, 
                                               
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 2004), VI, 1026a.  
2 Proclus, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), Introduction, p. 13, 37. 
3 Ibid., 1040ff.; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(California: Coyote Canyon Press, 2018), I, Q. 3, A. 2, p. 32. 
4 Proclus, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), Introduction p. 12. 
5 Ibid., VI, 1040ff.  
6 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (California: 
Coyote Canyon Press, 2018), I, Q. 1, A.1, p. 27. 
7 Ibid., I, Q. 2, Art. 3, p. 31. 
8 Ibid., I, Q. 1, Art. 2, p. 27. 
9 Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 21. 
4 
on the other hand, is a matter of extensive discussion since a scholarly consensus still 
needs to be reached to about this matter. Dionysius the Areopagite is said to have been 
converted by Saint Paul, the Apostle, and present at the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. 
However, at the end of the 15th century, the Florentine humanist Lorenzo Valla proved 
that the identity of the thinker behind the corpus of writings of Dionysius the 
Areopagite does not match with the saint that witnessed Christ’s crucifixion, thus, 
receiving the prefix of “pseudo”10. 
What the following comparative essay will attempt is to render intelligible the 
profound implications of Plato’s Parmenides and how traces of its meaning are secretly 
woven in the very core of the Sacred Doctrine. 
I. What can be said of the One/God beyond Being? 
General introduction to the Negations 
This section of the study will focus on the relationship between the One in the first 
hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides, as further articulated by Proclus, and Thomas 
Aquinas’ view of God in the highest sense. Proclus defines a “hypothesis” as “that 
which takes part of the procedure and produces similar conclusions, either all 
affirmative or all negative or both.”11   
The first hypothesis in Plato’s Parmenides dialectically explores the One as 
superior to Being and to all other things, by intelligibly negating all predicates that 
could in turn be said of the One coordinate with Being. While affirmations are 
considered positive in the world of empirical sciences, the negations present in the 
Parmenides are higher and beyond the former, since they are most fit to describe what 
is transcendent all knowledge and perception. For Plato denies that the One is or is not 
but even negation itself.12 Plato’s hypothesis reaches the truly ineffable. Pseudo-
Dionysius interprets this to mean that Plato by begins from the hypothetical and ends 
in that which is unhypothetical and, as stated earlier, ineffable.13 In this following 
section the discussion will refrain from affirmatively attributing any physical predicates 
of God and will deal only with denials of all sorts of categories of beings, whether they 
may be intellectual or corporeal.  
The Cloud of Unknowing 
St. Thomas Aquinas says in the Summa Theologica: "He is supremely undivided 
inasmuch as He is divided, neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; 
since He is altogether simple.”14 This kind of language strongly reverberates 
Aristotelian terminology, later further discussed in this text. Similarly, Plato affirms: 
“If there is a One, of course the One will not be many.”15 When referring to God, St. 
Thomas utilizes He while in Attic Greek, the terminology of αὐτός frequently denotes 
in Plato a relation with excellence in the divine. From these two passages follows that 
that which is beyond all things must be a pure One, possessing no parts and being fully 
undivided. It would be relevant to question whether the One and God are the same, 
similar or different in the view of these thinkers. Since it has been shown that both 
                                               
10 Ibid., p. 34. 
11 Proclus, VI, 1052ff., In the same passage Proclus further clarifies this definition: “It makes no difference 
to them whether we draw these conclusions in relation to itself or to something else, but only that the 
quality of the proposition is the same”. 
12 Plato, Parmenides, trans. F. M. Cornford (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973), 142b.  
13 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987), 1025B. 
14 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (California: 
Coyote Canyon Press, 2018), I, Q. 11, Art. 4, p. 46. 
15 Plato, Parmenides, trans. F. M. Cornford (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973), 137c.  
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Plato and St. Thomas explore a supreme oneness of the One/God, the discussion ought 
to move on to what follows from the latter’s assertion, that God is supremely One, by 
using an abbreviated form of a Platonic inspired method through the first hypothesis of 
the Parmenides when discussing the ineffable One.     
If God is one, He cannot be many. He cannot be a whole, for a whole is made of 
parts. He cannot have a beginning, middle, end, or shape. God is not anywhere, being 
neither in Himself nor in another. If He were in Himself, He would be both container 
and contained, while being One. If He were in another, He would be encompassed by 
that in which it is contained, and that is impossible if God is supremely One. If He were 
in motion, He would be moving either in place or undergoing alteration. If the former 
was true, then God would have a center around which its parts would be moving, while 
if the latter was true, then He would change into something other than Himself. Since 
God, as previously shown, cannot be in the same place, it follows that He can be neither 
at rest nor in motion. Consequently, God is not the same as Himself nor is He the same 
as another for sameness is different from God and in predicating sameness of God, He 
would become both, One and not One. In the latter case, He would become different 
from Himself. If He would be other than Himself or other than another that would imply 
multiplicity, which was previously stated. Consequently, God can be neither like nor 
unlike Himself. The same applies to God being like or unlike another. Furthermore, 
God cannot be either equal or unequal to Himself or to another, since being equal means 
having the same measures as anything to which one may be equal. Since God does not 
have likeness, equality, or sameness, He cannot be younger, older, or of the same age 
as Himself or as another. And thus, God cannot participate in time by any means. If 
God does not participate in time, He never was, nor can one say He has become or is 
becoming or is, or that He will be in the future. Since all beings participate in time, it 
can only follow that God, spoken of in the highest sense, cannot be coordinate with 
Being, given that, the conclusions are true. Ultimately, it follows that God is neither the 
One nor One nor that He is or is not in any way like the One.16  
We have examined the character of the Platonic One and the Christian God, in the 
sense of being purely one and different, therefore we will now strictly explore the 
Thomistic theological framework of God. In the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas says: 
“Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no 
means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not”.17 Here, God is denied 
Being in a transcendental way.  When using the word “is”, St. Thomas refers to the 
knowledge of God, which is unattainable through any sort of affirmative reasoning 
process. Elsewhere, he says there is no name that can be attributed to God, not even the 
name “God”. According to St. Thomas, a name is communicable either by similitude 
or properly. By similitude, a name is attributed to things that are part of the signification 
of the name in question such as “biped” and “rational”, which participate in the nature 
of humankind. The latter sense is used when giving one name to many belonging to the 
same species; the same way the word “humankind” is predicated of all beings which 
are of this same nature, and thus, names are never given particularly but universally.  
St. Thomas finds neither of these ways suitable for the cause of all beings. He reaches 
the conclusion that the name “God” is communicable only by means of opinion, and 
not in reality, given the ontological distinction between the two.18 This conclusion is 
worth noted for the means of communicating “God” by ‘opinion’ unlike reality. Yet, 
“God” is beyond Being, as constituting its source and no name or opinion can be 
attributed to Him who is the source of all things. Moreover, St. Thomas Aquinas utilizes 
a negative dialectic to reach God, as influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius: “For this would 
be really to see and to know: to praise the Transcendent One in a transcending way, 
                                               
16 All negations are displayed in the same order Plato explored them; Plato, Parmenides, trans. F. M. 
Cornford (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973), 137c - 142a. 
17 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (California: 
Coyote Canyon Press, 2018), I, Q. 3 Art. 1, p. 31. 
18 Ibid., I, Q.13, Art. 9, p. 55. 
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namely through the denial of all beings.”19  
The next question will explore what the purpose of the negations is and the role 
they play in the attaining of the fullest and highest vision the created intellect has the 
capacity for. In order to answer the proposed inquiry, in discussing the cloud of 
unknowing, Pseudo-Dionysius says: “Here, renouncing all that the mind may conceive, 
wrapped entirely in the intangible and the invisible, he belongs completely to him who 
is beyond everything. Here being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely 
united to the completely unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge and knows beyond 
the mind by knowing nothing.”20 According to the ineffable nature of God, the mind 
may leave all knowing and unknowing in order to attain the highest vision capable for 
humankind. This divine ascent is actualized through the purification of the images one 
may have of God. This is a hierarchical ascent from the lowest and closest to the visible 
realm, such as shapes and magnitudes, to the divine realm such as to Spirit, and the 
Good.  Also, since God is present in all things by means of power, presence, and 
essence,21 these images exist everywhere, as taking both corporeal and incorporeal 
forms. As approaching this most beautiful vision of Him, the images or predicates one 
may have of God ought to diminish in number until reaching that divine darkness where 
He dwells; concealed from all the light among beings. Similarly, St. Thomas accepts 
this view: “God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; 
but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any 
demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any 
part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it 
is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known.”22 To him, one may also have 
such a vision as the one described by Pseudo-Dionysius, since it is remote from all 
demonstrable propositions, reason and does not constitute knowledge of God, but only 
the highest vision of Him accessible to humankind. This does not refute, by any means, 
the incomprehensibility of God. For this vision cannot be denominated as knowledge, 
for the reasons mentioned above.  The experience described by Pseudo-Dionysius is 
reminiscent of Proclus and can be seen in the Parmenides through the series of 
negations, including of all images, thus ascending from Being to the inexpressible 
itself.23 
Having shown the interchangeable character of the One and God, as understood in 
the highest sense and having proved the similarities in terms of the means to both, 
attaining and defining the highest vision of God/One, it can only follow that the goal 
of the first hypothesis as understood through the lens of Pseudo-Dionysius had 
profound effects on the development of St. Thomas Aquinas’ theological system. 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ reach is concisely summarized by Ronald F. Hathaway: “It is 
sufficient to name John of Damascus, John Scotus Eriugena, Richard and Hugh of St. 
Victor, Thomas Aquinas, Nicolas of Cusa, Eckhart, Robert Grosseteste, Dante, and 
Marsilio Ficino to sense the breadth of his [Pseudo-Dionysius] direct influence on 
medieval thought.”24 Hathaway goes further in stating that Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
“hierarchic theory has ramifications pertinent not only to modern and medieval 
ecclesiastical history and theology, but also to the history of philosophy as a whole.”25 
                                               
19 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987), 1025B. 
20 Ibid., 1001A. 
21 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (California: 
Coyote Canyon Press, 2018), I, Q. 8, Art. 1, p. 41. 
22 Ibid., I, Q. 12, Art. 7, p. 49. 
23 Proclus, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), VII, 76K. 
24 Ronald F. Hathaway, Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius 
(Massachusetts: Brandeis University, 1969), I, p. 8.  
25 Ibid., I, p. 9.  
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II. What can be said of the One/God coordinate with Being? 
The Distinction  
This next section will explore the relationship between the second hypothesis of 
Plato’s Parmenides, and St. Thomas Aquinas’ view of God as coordinate with Being, 
which is second in rank from the ineffable Good. To accomplish this goal, the following 
discussion will expound the most distinctive universal properties and functions St. 
Thomas assigns to God taken in the former sense. These will be followed by a 
comparative inquiry of the limited and the unlimited character of God, as illustrated by 
both Plato and St. Thomas, who, as stated previously, understands Plato through the 
lens of Pseudo-Dionysius.  
Before diving into this inquiry, the distinction between the One/God beyond Being 
and the One/God coordinate with Being must be clarified. In his Commentary on 
Plato’s Parmenides, Proclus brings forth this same issue by saying: “For he (Plato) 
knows that  One has two meanings-- in one sense it transcends, in the other it is 
coordinate with, is. In the latter sense, it is in a way comparable to existence as 
participating and being participated in by it. But in the former, it is incomparable and 
imparticipable by everything.”26 Since the One which is, means that it is coordinate 
with Being, is in a way comparable to existence, predicates such as magnitude, shape, 
limit, time, motion, rest and all the other attributes -negated in the first section- can 
now be both asserted and negated of He who is, in such a way, that affirmative 
conclusions can be reached about that through which all beings exist. This is the subject 
matter which serves as the conceptual framework of this section and is expounded in 
the second hypothesis. Comparably, St. Thomas makes a similar distinction in the 
following passage: “This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this 
name ‘God,’ as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of 
signification and consignification, as said above.”27 Consequently, he differentiates the 
name “God” as  incommunicable from its lower counterpart bound with Being; which 
is a more proper appellation inasmuch as all things exist through “He who is”. This can 
also be understood as the signification of the latter denomination in the Thomistic 
sense.  Furthermore, the consignification of the name “He who is'' simply refers to its 
universality, namely the boundless nature of all things participating in God’s essence.  
And thus, this finding will allow the possibility of positively inquiring about the 
“Source and end of all things.”28 
The Thomistic Theological Framework of God 
The topic by itself has been, and still is, a matter of extensive scholarly discussion, 
thus the following paragraph will serve as an extensive list of the most distinct universal 
divine names and functions St. Thomas uses when discussing “He who is”; apart from 
the transcendent Godhead. This is going to serve as the foundation of the following 
inquiry of the Unlimited and Limited as seen in the One which is.  
St. Thomas describes God as the first mover, immovable, eternal, needing to be, 
existing always, immutable, as having no beginning, no end, existing simultaneously, 
simple, not a composite, free from all contrariety, being his own essence,29  pure act,  
                                               
26 Proclus, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), VII, 34ff. 
27 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (California: 
Coyote Canyon Press, 2018), I, Q. 13, Art. 11, p. 56. 
28 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987), 825B. 
29 Essence (οὐσία) is defined by Aristotle (Metaphysics; Zeta 1035b) as the form of a composite, as soul is 
to humankind. Essence in Aristotle has the property of kinesis similar to how the soul is said to operate, 
being as it is, that towards which it moves, its own final cause. (κῑν́ησῐς = locomotion, alteration, decay, 
growth) (Aristotle; De Anima I.3 406a). All of the powers of the soul are said to be movements in this 
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one, infinite quantity, power, as embracing all beings, and as supreme perfection. He 
continues by asserting that all perfection found in things preexists in Him abundantly 
and that all perfections are one in God. Additionally, being, power, action, and other 
similar attributes pertain to perfection and are identical with His essence. There is 
neither definition of nor form and matter in Him, thus being the cause of all 
intellectuality. Neither succession nor discursive reasoning are in God’s understanding. 
What He understands and that which is understood is identical with His essence, and 
everything is comprehended in His intellect by a single act of intuition. God loves 
everything by a single act of His Will and does not presuppose matter in His activity. 
He brought all things into existence, and nothing is coeternal with Him. He is the first 
truth from which all other truths have their certitude, moves things in a way that is 
consonant with their nature, helps humankind by an increase of light, communicates 
existence to all things just as the sun emanates light, is the cause of the continuation of 
existence in things, is in all things by essence, power and presence, and arranges and 
orders through the means of intermediate causes.30  
The Limited/Unlimited 
The following discussion will explore this pair of opposites as present in the second 
hypothesis of the Parmenides by using Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 
as the foundation for all the explanation that is to follow. This investigation aims at 
showing the implications of the dialectical exploration of the One as seen in the 
Platonic text, later brought to a close relation with St. Thomas’ conceptual framework 
of God, through as many Thomistic attributes of God as possible.31  
In the Parmenides, one of the conclusions reached in the first hypothesis is that 
“the end and the beginning are the limits of each thing.”32 Therefore, “the One is 
unlimited, if it has neither beginning nor end.” 33 Regarding this issue Proclus discerns 
that in the second hypothesis, and in the interests of establishing the triad of beginning, 
middle, and end, Plato brings the Limited and the Unlimited in relationship to the One. 
In this sense, it is said to be resting where it is, proceeding forth and returning to itself 
while holding together its “peak of superiority” (κατ’ἄκραν υπερβολήv).34 A more 
recent translation by Juan F. Balboa presents this notion as “Its Summit of Hyperbolic-
Excellence”. The translator explains that he sees this notion analogical to a phrase in 
Plato's Republic, Book VI, where Glaucon exclaims in a jovial way: “Daemonic Apollo 
of Hyperbolic Heights!”, to which Socrates remarks that the ideas are not only 
mentally-recognized by the Good, but by their existence and ousia also derived from 
that Source, whereas ousia is not an attribute of the Good, since the Good transcends 
beyond ousia both in dignity/rank and in power. Hence, Juan F. Balboa further clarifies 
that when Proclus wrote about 'Its Summit of Hyperbolic Excellence' he may have had 
this phrase of Glaucon's in mind, for on the one hand, the Hyperbolic-Heights that 
Glaucon saw is the Transcendent-Beyond that Socrates referred to, while on the other 
hand, the Summit or the Hyparxis, is always the most excellent perfection possible, in 
this case the One/Good. Ousia (οὐσίᾱ) in Plato, is a turning about itself, unlike 
                                               
sense. Additionally, essence, as attributed to God by St. Thomas, is superior to all other essences, to such 
an extent that all the other essences emerge from Him and return to Him. 
30 All the attributes come from the Summa of the Summa Theologica. The page numbers according to each 
of the predicates mentioned in the order in which they were illustrated goes as follows (two or more 
attributes may appear on the same page): 9, 10, 11 (two), 12 (three), 13, 14 (two), 15 (two), 16, 18, 21, 22 
(two), 23 (two), 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 51 (two), 64, 100, 107, 145 (two), 143, 146 (two), 152, 167.  
31 Both the structure and the interpretations explored in the following discussion illustrate an abbreviated 
form of Proclus’ exploration of the Limited and the Unlimited in Book VI of his Commentary on Plato’s 
Parmenides, 1116 - 1124. 
32 Plato, Parmenides, trans. F. M. Cornford (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973), 137d. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Proclus, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), VI, 1116ff. 
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Aristotle’s explicit notion, and can also be seen as the One’s intellection, existence, and 
generative properties. This notion is also partially grasped in St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
proposition in that there is neither discursive reasoning, nor multiplicity in God and 
that the mind of God is identical with His essence (also the common translation of 
“οὐσίᾱ”). 
Proclus continues the inquiry about the Limited and the Unlimited with the different 
ways in which unlimitedness applies to the One coordinate with Being. Namely, it is 
unlimited in this way, that it is incomprehensible and unencompassable while also 
being the limit of everything that has existence without imposing any limit on itself. 
Another understanding of the One’s unlimitedness is infinite power, along with the 
causal interpretation of this attribute, for all things are generated by it, and that all the 
unlimitedness immanent in the visible world is caused by the One which is.  
Furthermore, the Unlimited may be spoken of as Eternity itself which is most 
appropriately accordant with the One/God, as denoting both its comprehension and 
causation of the whole infinity of the intelligible realm. Additionally, it is called the 
“fountain of all infinity (τήν πρωτιστην πηγήν αυτήν) — intelligible, intellectual, 
psychic (pertaining to the soul), corporeal, or material.” 35 The One also arranges and 
orders all things through intermediate causes, as the secondary classes of beings depend 
on the ones prior to them, for “the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the 
mean”.36 This describes the analogy: noesis is to dianoia as pistis is to eikasia. 
Ultimately, material generation is held together through eternal generation which 
participates in the Unlimited.  
The discussion will now turn to examine the “chain of Limit” (τήν σειρᾱ́ν τοῦ 
πέρατος).37 The primary way in which this is predicated of the One is as the “fount and 
foundation of all limits, intelligible, intellectual, supracosmic, encosmic, preexistent 
itself as the measure and bound of all things.”38 The second limit attributed to it is 
Eternity, since it is both limited and unlimited by virtue of being the “measure of all 
intellectual activity and the bound of the life of the intellect.”39 The One is also static, 
immovable and immutable by virtue of remaining in and turning upon itself, thus 
bounded and limited, being the first principle of all motion.40 Since it becomes neither 
more nor less than itself, it has been said to be limited, along with causing Time which 
is both the measure and the limit of all things. The form in matter can be seen also as 
caused by limit, since humankind is confined to the characteristics and properties 
belonging to its species. The One which is, is also pure actuality in the sense that it is 
the object of desire of all things. These, in turn, have existence and power in accordance 
with their respective nature, denoting limit.  
In his work, Archetypal Psychology, Dreamwork, and Neoplatonism, Gregory 
Shaw inquiries into the relationship of the Limited and Unlimited in respect to the soul’s 
ascent towards the One. For, in discussing Iamblichus, he states: “Mediating opposites 
was the soul’s only way to enter the hidden activity of the One which, according to 
Iamblichus, was an entirely ineffable principle ‘known’ only through the mixing of its 
equally unknowable derivatives: the Limit and the Unlimited, from which all number 
and existence derive.”41 Thus, it is through the mediation of opposites such as 
sameness/difference, rest/motion, limited/unlimited that the soul trains its vision to the 
One. The exploration of divinity by means of opposites is a method that seems to be 
employed upon by both Plato and Aristotle and it is empiricism that separates the latter 
                                               
35 Ibid., VI, 1120ff. 
36 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973), 32a. 
37 Proclus, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), VI, 1121ff. 
38 Ibid., VI, 1121ff. 
39 Ibid., VI, 1122ff. 
40 Ibid., VI, 1122ff. 
41 Gregory Shaw, Archetypal Psychology, Dreamwork, and Neoplatonism (Massachusetts: Stonehill 
College, 2016), I, p. 332.  
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from the former in expressing this spiritual exercise. According to Iamblichus, 
however, in animating the body, the soul shares in mortality and its essence (οὐσία) 
becomes fragmented into essences (οὐσίαι), and thus its ousia is both “one and 
many”42. And it is through the contemplation of opposites, reflecting upon the soul’s 
nature as intermediate between the immortality of gods and the mortality of generated 
beings, that it becomes a container for receiving the gods. Plato reiterates this same 
idea in the Timaeus, at 34c-35a, where he expounds on the nature of the soul: “From 
the being which is indivisible and unchangeable, and from that kind of being which is 
distributed among bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of being.”43 
Alan Cardew finds traces of these doctrines manifest within the development of modern 
psychology, as seen in the case of Carl Jung, for the former says that “In his last great 
work, Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of 
Psychic Opposites in Alchemy (1955–1956), Jung returns to an enquiry into the 
opposition of elements in the psyche which he had first examined in 1921 in 
Psychological Types.”44  
The current inquiry has now explored the various classes of both the Limited and 
the Unlimited, and the specific character and function that each of the two possesses in 
relation to the One which is and to the soul’s means to ascent. This has also been seen 
in Iamblichus’ thought traced back to Plato and its extension and relevance in modern 
psychology. Lastly, for the purpose of this paper, we note the significant impact of 
Plato’s Parmenides, further elucidated by Proclus’ thought then converted by Pseudo-
Dionysius’ and later its influence on St. Thomas Aquinas’ theological framework and 
his assertions of “God”. 
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas 
Alongside the Corpus Areopagiticum and the Bible, Aristotle and his translations 
constitute other relevant pillars upon which St. Thomas Aquinas’ theology relies. In 
addition to the five ways to prove God’s existence, two ideas that are predominant 
throughout the Aristotelian corpus of writings also play a crucial role in the 
development of St. Thomas’ theology as seen in passages such as: “Now every being 
is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and 
potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but 
after they make up and compose it.”45 The ideas of potentiality and actuality seem to 
be derived from natural processes such as the life cycle of a plant developing from a 
mere seed into a living organism. In other words, the seed contains within itself all that 
it requires in order to grow from a state of potentiality to one of actuality. In part, this 
empirical method developed by Aristotle appears to have emerged from his displayed 
understanding of both the Presocratics and Plato. In order to accomplish this goal, we 
will proceed with a contrast between Democritus’ thought and Aristotle’s 
understanding of it, which will then be related to the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Democritus states that truth that we meet “perceptually is nothing reliable”46, “by 
convention there is sweet, bitter, hot and cold”47, “opinions flow”48 and there is “no 
lightning-flash hurled by Zeus that does not contain pure light from the aether.”49 In 
essence, these passages embody what would later become Platonic thought. For the 
insufficiency of the irrational faculties of the soul, in respect to the pursuit of 
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knowledge of the divine is impartible from Platonic thought. Conversely, Aristotle 
makes numerous points about the opposite stand, claiming that Democritus posits that 
“whatever appears to the senses must be true”50. Other passages solidify Aristotle’s 
stand in regards to Democritus: “Democritus thus explains why life and death are bound 
up with respiration”51 and what Democritus “says is that the soul and the hot are 
identical”52. Aristotle thus employs science and rigorous empirical demonstrations as 
the foundation of his thought, which can develop abilities to, eventually, ascend to 
Platonic thought. On the basis of this kind of understanding, the Stagirite weaves a 
system of opinions regarding both Democritus and the other Presocratics, which 
appears to deviate from the original doctrines expounded by the latter. In this regard, 
however, there is a great deal of uncertainty, for very few fragments from Democritus 
survived until modern times. Thus, Aristotle approaches theology physically, and as 
inseparable from nature and its afferent processes53 which resonates with St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ own development of theology, as seen in the following section of this inquiry. 
St. Thomas Aquinas’ theology reflects the ideas of ascent from appearances, 
motion and mutation, to an immovable, immutable, and indivisible cause. He espouses, 
as influenced by the aforementioned predecessors, that every thing which is moved, is 
moved by something, and that the first mover must, out of necessity, be immovable and 
pure actuality.54  Aristotle states: “Our principle, the primary being, is unmovable both 
intrinsically and accidentally and yet is the source of the primary movement, which is 
eternal and single”.55 As shown above, St. Thomas utilized the theology developed by 
Aristotle for the purpose of ascending to the Platonic dialectic, yet, he remained loyal 
to Christian interpretations. For every article of the Summa Theologica is a simplified 
imitation of oral instruction and each article is caught up in larger dialectical patterns.56  
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle denominates four causes as the fundamental 
principles that rule the cosmos (κόσμος), namely the 1) efficient, 2) material, 3) formal, 
and 4) final cause.57 These, however, only explain the sublunary world and hence, they 
lack in respect to the spiritual realm. As Aristotle’s scientific and empirical methods of 
demonstration pervade the exposition of his thought, the four causes had emerged from 
natural observations, akin, in terms of origin, to the ideas of potentiality and actuality. 
In turn, St. Thomas’ use of the Aristotelian causes is ubiquitous throughout the Summa 
Theologica, both directly and indirectly. The following passages have as purpose to 
provide a glimpse of the ways in which St. Thomas employs the four aforementioned 
demonstrative principles: “Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction 
of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to 
its first cause.”58 Moreover, when “therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, 
or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something 
received”59, and “it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and 
although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more 
imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still 
to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but 
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in a more perfect way.”60 St. Thomas’ use of the Stagirite’s causes mirrors the same 
dynamic and functionality expounded by the latter. For Aristotle seems to understand 
divinity as manifested within nature, as an ascent from the visible to the intelligible, 
but only by virtue of causation in a limited realm of ideas and not by participation in 
personal ideals.  
Throughout all of the Platonic dialogues, the notion of participation in ideas and 
ideals is continuous and functions as the means by which the natural world interacts 
analogously and anagogically with the intelligible realm. In providing a systematic 
demonstration of Platonic thought, Proclus denominates seven causes, in contrast with 
Aristotle’s four, that encompass the higher functions of causation and participation.  
Namely, they are the 1) One Ineffable Cause, the 2) paradigmatic, 3) formal, 4) 
creative, 5) instrumental, 6) material and 7) final cause, that not only differentiate the 
Peripatetic tradition from the Platonic one, but shift the focus from the sublunary realm 
to the intelligible one, in addition to the afferent relationship and reciprocal 
participation of the two.61 For the creative cause, Proclus posits, as seen within the 
productive manifestation of the Creator, takes place by its “very being” (‘τῶ εἶναι’)62, 
“effortless and we must concede that effortlessness belongs primarily to the divine.”63 
The idea of creation by means of abundance and “effortlessness” is devoid of the 
diminishing dynamic of human creation, for all kinds of production processes that take 
place in the realm of the latter are actualized by means of a higher meaning of sacrifice, 
be that intellectual, physical, or temporal. Proclus goes further in stating that the highest 
creative cause is imperative to be endowed with volition, namely the One, or God-- if 
this could be translated in Christian terms.64 Furthermore, the instrumental cause is said 
to be representative of the participation of all beings in the brilliant light of Providence65 
in addition to the continuous governing of the unparticipated, participated and 
immanent classes of Ideas over the visible and intelligible realms.66 The paradigmatic 
cause, however, is assigned strictly to the world of Platonic Ideas and their relationship 
with the world, as existing within the soul.67 The aforementioned lay the conditions for 
the created intellect to ascend to an understanding of the Self, or the One, as more 
commonly translated, by training the “purest intuition of the soul” 68 for this encounter. 
The Idea of the Self in Platonic thought has been rediscovered and is widely researched 
by Pierre Grimes.69 As Aristotle’s four causes do away with the idea of participation, 
the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions become irreconcilable in this respect. As seen 
within St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, the respective profound influence 
exerted by Aristotle and his translations poses a great difficulty, an impossibility, 
indeed, in reconciling Platonism and St. Thomas Aquinas’ systematic theology.  
The natural use of αὐτός and λόγος in Aristotle’s works attempt, possibly, to build 
an intellectual bridge by which the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, constructed 
through the lens of Pseudo-Dionysius and his Christian-Mystical conversion of 
Neoplatonist Proclus’ commentaries, may be able to ascend to the Platonic tradition. 
For αὐτός, may also stand to be translated as Self, and it signifies the recognition of 
excellence and divinity and can serve as accompanying the One, in certain instances, 
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in Plato’s Parmenides. For the purpose of exploring this matter of inquiry, we will 
proceed by displaying a few Greek quotes from the Metaphysics, which will then be 
contrasted with Hugh Lawson-Tancred’s translation of them.  
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle states:  
 
“ὁ δ’αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ γραμμῆς καὶ στιγμῆς καὶ μονάδος”70, “ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ 
μόνον ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων”71, 
and “ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστί, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς 
τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, 
ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου 
λόγῳ ἢ οὔ.”72  
 
In the same order, Hugh Lawson-Tancred translates: 
  
“And it is also clear that this applies to points, lines, and planes”73, “more to 
the point, the account of each is the same, as even the present arguments have 
shown”74, and “The definition is an account. Now every account has its parts, 
and there is an isomorphism between the relation of the account to the entity 
that it concerns and the relation of a part of the account to a part of the entity.”75 
  
At 1002b, an alternate translation may apply:  
 
“And it is also clear that the Self Logos applies to points, lines, and planes” 
and, at 1031b-1032a, the passage may go as follows: “more to the point, the 
Logos of each is the Self, as even the present arguments have shown.” Lastly, 
for 1034b, the literal translation of the word λόγος is: “The definition is the 
Logos. Now every Logos has its parts, and there is an isomorphism between 
the relation of the Logos to the entity that it concerns and the relation of a part 
of the Logos to a part of the entity.” 
 
When translated in this manner, the spiritual dimension of the text is evinced, such 
that the empirical “account” becomes Logos, the fundamental ordering principle of the 
cosmos. Similarly, in the Gospel of John, “In the beginning was the Word (Logos)”76 
or “the Logos was the in the Cause/Source/First Principle”77, the Logos is the Son of 
God and that through which the act of creation is actualized. The translation of αὐτός 
as Self-- which appears 1219 times in Metaphysics78, however, brings a new, yet, 
perhaps originally intended vitality even to Aristotle’s thought and it raises the meaning 
and implications of his natural and systematic philosophy, a topic of paramount 
significance which will be explored in an upcoming scholarly project. These 
differences in translation would shift both the spiritual end goal and the means to 
attaining it, an idea reiterated by Thomas Taylor who explains through the use of 
Simplicius’ Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle that “in his acroamatic writings, 
he [Aristotle] studies obscurity, through this deterring the more indolent, as if their very 
appearance evinced they were not written for them.”79 Aristotle’s writings follow the 
exoteric, historical, natural lines of thought which do not pay attention to extreme 
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accuracy, in contrast with Plato, after the manner of Pythagoreans, who contemplated 
whatever is natural as it partakes of the divine. Thus, the matter in question is one that 
ought to be expounded and analyzed extensively with more profundity of thought in an 
upcoming work. For now, this discussion notes the possibility of facilitating the 
conditions for a more complete understanding of St. Thomas Aquinas’ theology, 
influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle as seen in the Light of Platonism and 
Neoplatonism. 
Counterarguments 
The modern world can be highly vexed by the light of the ancient wisdom and 
especially by ancient philosophy with its higher ideas and ideals to ‘Know Thyself’ 
(‘γνῶθι σεαυτόν’)80. In this section we will briefly explore the positions of Thomas 
Cajetan, Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche in respect to St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
theology and its relation with ancient thought. Before exploring the aforementioned, I 
will proceed with making a distinction regarding the meaning of essence (οὐσία). For 
essence, as used by Plato and the tradition that followed him has a different dynamic 
and functionality as opposed to the Aristotelian use of the same term.  
St. Thomas Aquinas posits in On Being and Essence: “Therefore, the essence 
clearly comprises both matter and form”,81 and “since, as said above, the essence is that 
which is signified by the definition, accidents will thus have essences in the same way 
in which they have definitions”82. As discussed in the section dedicated to the 
Thomistic theological framework of God, essence denotes the function of turning upon 
itself and is similar to how the soul is said to operate, being as it is, that towards which 
it moves, its own final cause. This dimension of essence, however, is only indirectly 
alluded to, by both St. Thomas and Aristotle, more predominantly in the former than 
in the latter. For, as explored by the two, essence has no vitality or dynamic function 
attributed to it, and neither does it have the capacity of endowing beings with the 
cognitive capacity of exercising the dianoetic powers of the soul. This is an idea that is 
representative of the Platonic tradition and whose meaning is lacking in respect to the 
works of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The former reiterates the position of St. Thomas in 
the Metaphysics, a work cited multiple times in On Being and Essence. Aristotle states: 
“Well, essence is, for each thing, what is taken to be per se”83, and on “such grounds, 
then, it can be shown that the particular thing itself and its essence is the same”,84 and 
the “essence of a thing, whose account is a definition, is also said to be the substance 
of the particular”85. The argument goes as follows: definition is an account of essence, 
that is to say the parts of the whole without which the latter could no longer be 
denominated as that which it is. For instance, the essence of humankind will not 
comprise height, skin color, or other such accidentals, but it is imperative for it to 
behold attributes such as biped, rational, and moral. In summary, essence is the 
Aristotelian form of substance for the substance constitutes a “composite whole”.86 
When exploring the nature of divinity and its relations with humankind, St. Thomas 
Aquinas most often uses ‘essence’ in this sense and only implicitly alludes to the 
Platonic vision, as showed in the section mentioned above. This understanding of 
essence communicates a glimpse of the naturalist and scientific thought of Aristotle, 
devoid, at least in the literal approach, of the spiritual character and vibrancy of the 
Platonic language. Later interpretations of St. Thomas’ works reflect this 
methodological and spiritual chasm between the two systems. For instance, Étienne 
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Gilson criticizes Thomas Cajetan, an ardent Aristotelian defender, to having interpreted 
the Summa Theologica from the perspective of a reductionistic ontology of substance, 
thus causing an incompatibility between philosophy and Christianity.87  
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger, influenced by Aristotle developing his 
thought through modern philosophers such as Francisco Suárez, stated that: “The 'soul' 
which makes up the Being of man has αἴσθησῐς and νόησις among its ways of Being, 
and in these it discovers all entities, both in the fact that they are, and in their Being as 
they are - that is, always in their Being. Aristotle's principle, which points back to the 
ontological thesis of Parmenides, is one which Thomas Aquinas has taken up in a 
characteristic discussion”88 and that the “‘dialectic’, which has been a genuine 
philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous. That is why Aristotle ‘no longer 
has any understanding’ of it, for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to 
a new level”.89 It appears from these lines that Heidegger thinks that Thomas Aquinas 
is influenced by Aristotle’s principle which he directly, yet, erroneously “points back” 
to Parmenides, disregarding the “dialectic”, which is essential for this work, however, 
he deems it as a “genuine philosophical embarrassment”. Moreover, Heidegger has not 
questioned or he has avoided the matter of translations, interpretations or thorough 
understanding of ancient texts. As it has been explored in the previous section, the 
understanding of Aristotle in respect to the Presocratics is at least questionable and 
uncertain, having begun to demonstrate the matter by the case of Democritus. 
Heidegger posits Aristotelian empiricism and scientific means on a higher level which 
illustrates his loyalty to the continental philosophy of his time in the context of mere 
intellectual analysis separated from personal meaning and metaphysical truth. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, on the other hand, addresses the widespread belief system of 
Christianity and indirectly the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas as part of this tradition 
in The Anti-Christ. Nietzsche makes two crucial observations: that “mankind should 
fall on its knees before the opposite of what was the origin, the meaning, the right of 
the Gospel, that it should have sanctified in the concept of ‘Church’ precisely what the 
‘bringer of glad tidings’ regarded as beneath him, behind him – one seeks in vain a 
grander form of world-historical irony”90, and “Paul, with that rabbinical insolence 
which characterizes him in every respect, rationalized this interpretation, this indecency 
of an interpretation, thus: ‘If Christ is not resurrected from the dead our faith is vain’. 
– All at once the Evangel became the most contemptible of all unfulfillable promises, 
the impudent doctrine of personal immortality. . . Paul himself even taught it as a 
reward! . . .”.91 It follows that Nietzsche denominates the Pauline interpretations as the 
main influence on the Roman Catholic Church, which includes neither Plato, nor 
Aristotle. He goes further by expounding that the doctrine of Resurrection as 
interpreted by St. Paul is the cornerstone of Christianity and that this interpretation is 
implicitly embedded within the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. The subject of Pauline 
Christianity and its widespread ramifications enter a distinct realm of further inquiry 
separate from what has been explored throughout the totality of this paper. 
Both Nietzsche and Heidegger posit modern counterarguments to ancient thought 
by their alliance to continental philosophy which is characterized by intellectual 
analysis devoid of the Logos of the Self and of its cognitive consequences. Each thinker 
shows that St. Thomas Aquinas encountered major problems and interpretations in the 
establishment of his theology, the matter having been implicitly stated by Nietzsche 
while directly evinced by Heidegger. Moreover, the Thomistic understanding of 
essence, as inherited by Aristotle and developed by thinkers such as Thomas Cajetan, 
provides an irreconcilable incompatibility between Platonism and St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
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theology. These perspectives also deserve future explorations in greater depth and 
detail. 
Faith and Reason 
The following inquiry will deal with another irreconcilable difference between St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ emphasis on the primacy of faith over reason, the converse being 
true of Platonism.   
St. Thomas’ view of faith may be seen from the following passages: “Although 
those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through 
his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by 
faith.”92 And by “faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were 
unable to discover by natural reason”.93 There are many other passages in the Summa 
Theologica evincing the same idea of the supremacy of faith over reason, in terms of 
knowledge of the divine. To St. Thomas, faith is above reason in the sense that it has a 
greater capacity for “super intellectual knowledge of God”94. The summarized 
argument goes as follows: since intellect exercises understanding by means of likeness 
and discursive reasoning, the highest vision of that which is beyond all knowing may 
be brought about by faith, inasmuch as it is removed from the bounds of reason.95   
 
On the other hand, Plato, as seen from the model in the Republic, places faith third 
in rank from the highest function of the soul, intellect.96 Both Plato and Pseudo-
Dionysius consider that the means to ascend towards the transcendent One is through 
the negation of all beings, departing from all knowledge, opinion, belief and images, 
as previously discussed. A reference to belief is made in the Parmenides (141e): “but 
it seems that the One neither is one nor exists at all if one is to believe such an 
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argument”97. In exploring this passage, Proclus declares faith as “binding and uniting 
us to the One”98 however, only by means of being united with the rest of the soul’s 
cognitive functions.  
Alan Cardew expands further on this matter when discussing the method by which 
Neoplatonic thought brings about an experience of divinity. In his work, Antiquity and 
Anxiety, Alan states: “For the Neoplatonic philosopher, what is important is the 
bringing around of the return in an individual’s deepest being; this is the turn, the 
epistrophe”.99 By the practice of contemplation, dialectic, and other spiritual exercises, 
one may achieve such an experience as described in the previous sections. In this 
ascent, the discursive and reflective powers of the soul are directed towards the Self. 
This process mirrors the One’s intellection and thus it resembles God, for It is said to 
be the beginning and end of all beings. Accordingly, Alan unites the intellectual 
exploration with personal application: “The philosopher is the saviour of himself”.100 
In contrast with Christianity, the Platonic tradition explores the divine through the 
Logos of Self (‘ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος’)101 fully unindigent of the institutionalized belief system 
established by the Roman Catholic Church unquestioned by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
While both Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas establish that the intellect alone may see 
the divine essence, they differ in respect to the most appropriate means of attaining this 
vision. The latter postulates faith as the luminous guide of the created intellect, while 
the former designates the Logos, the dianoetic powers of the soul, as being most 
cathartic and enlightening.  
Conclusion 
We can see traces and projections of Platonism and Neoplatonism in the foundation 
of Christian theology. Accordingly, St. Thomas Aquinas attempts to utilize an ascent 
to Platonism through the influence of Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius. While the 
discordance on faith has a significant impact on differentiating Plato from St. Thomas 
Aquinas, there are various other matters that relate the two thinkers. As shown above, 
Plato’s Parmenides had indirectly impacted the Thomistic framework of “God” as 
displayed in the Summa Theologica, to the extent that the One and the Christian God 
have a share in identities and functions. Furthermore, Aristotle’s translations, which 
are questionable to date102, and his method and demonstrative precision also appear to 
have shaped St. Thomas Aquinas’ theology. For, the structure of the Summa 
Theologica mirrors Aristotle’s strict and successive style of writing. We note the 
aforementioned sources and influences on St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought, including a 
loyalty to Christian interpretations and the historical, psychological and philosophical 
milieus of the times, which led to the development of his theological doctrine. This 
implies significant consequences that ought to be brought up for scholarly 
considerations. The profound nature of this inquiry deserves further investigation, 
which the previous discussion only touched upon. Our comparative study ought to be 
deemed as a general basis of a future and more comprehensive exploration on whether 
the Platonic tradition is or is not reconcilable with Christian theology.103 
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